txt Title VII Prima Facie Cases: Volume 1

THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and discuss the elements of a Title VII prima facie case. Volume 1 of the casebook covers the District of Columbia Circuit and the First through the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Volume 2 of the casebook covers the Sixth through the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII's prohibition against discrimination extends to protect against either "a tangible employment action, such as a demotion or denial of promotion, or... a hostile or abusive working environment." Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 512 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment" (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993))).

[To] show "that the harassment created a hostile or abusive working environment." Harvill v. Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005), [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that:
(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was the victim of uninvited sexual [or racial] harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex [or race] (4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of [her] employment; and (5) her employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.
Id.; see also Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. 2012).

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To constitute "prompt remedial action" by an employer, the remedial action "must be reasonably calculated to end the harassment." Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n., 586 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 2009). This is "a fact-specific inquiry," as "not every response by an employer will be sufficient to absolve the employer of liability under Title VII." Williams-Boldware v. Denton County, 741 F.3d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nonetheless, "[i]n certain circumstances, we have held that an employer took prompt remedial action as a matter of law." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have so held, for instance, where immediately after the reported harassment, the manager separated the plaintiff and harasser and instructed the harasser to stay away. See Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 617 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Kreamer v. Henry's Towing, 150 F. App'x 378, 382-83 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding a prompt response where the employer issued a series of warnings and, after those warnings proved ineffective and the harassment sporadically continued and escalated over the course of six days, transferred offender away from the plaintiff).

Johnson v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ., 90 F. 4th 449 (5th Cir. 2024)